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Abstract
In this paper we study the relations between superadditivity and several types of convexity
for cooperative games with random payoffs. The types of convexity considered are marginal
convexity (all marginal vectors belong to the core), individual-merge convexity (any individual
player is better off joining a larger coalition) and coalitional-merge convexity (any coalition
of players is better off joining a larger coalition).
In particular, in this work we answer two open questions in the literature. The first
question is whether a marginal convex game is always superadditive. In general, the answer
is negative as is shown by two counterexamples. However, for some type of games marginal
convexity does imply superadditivity.
The second question is whether individual-merge convexity implies coalitional-merge con-
vexity for games with at least four players. An example of a four-player game that is
individual-merge convex but not coalitional merge convex shows that this is not the case
in general. But also here we show that for some type of games the implication does hold.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we study the relations between superadditivity and several types of convexity for
cooperative games with random payoffs. These games are introduced in [6] and subsequently
studied in [5] and [4]. The main characteristics of these games are that the payoff to a coalition is
modeled as a random variable and that the players have preferences to compare any two payoffs.
For more on these games we refer to [6].
The types of convexity considered are marginal convexity (all marginal vectors belong to the
core), individual-merge convexity (any individual player is better off joining a larger coalition)
and coalitional-merge convexity (any coalition of players is better off joining a larger coalition).
These types arise from extensions of several equivalent formulation of convexity for TU games to
cooperative games with random payoffs, but they are not equivalent. The same holds for the types
of convexity for NTU games [1, 2, 7] and for stochastic cooperative games [3].
In particular, in this paper we answer the two open questions in [6]:
• Is a marginal convex game superadditive?
• Is an individual-merge convex game with at least four players coalitional-merge convex?
The answer to the first question is, in general, negative. We provide two counterexamples for
different types of games. The first one is a three-person game with nonlinear preferences. The
second one is a four-person game with a certain type of linear preferences. Further, we show that
for some other type of linear preferences marginal convexity does imply superadditivity.
The second question follows from the fact that [6] shows that for games with at most three
players individual-merge convexity implies coalitional-merge convexity. This implication fails for
games with at least four players, as is shown by an example of a four player game that is individual-
merge convex but not coalitional-merge convex. However, we show that for games with a certain
type of linear preferences individual-merge convexity implies coalitional-merge convexity.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we introduce the concepts and definitions
needed. The relations between marginal convexity and superadditivity are studied in section
3. Section 4 continues with analysing the relations between individual-merge convexity and
coalitional-merge convexity. All proofs are postponed to appendix A.
2 Preliminaries
We follow the notation of [6]. A cooperative game with random payoffs, or game in short, is a
pair (N,α). N is the finite set of players and α = (αi)i∈N contains a complete description of the
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players’ preferences. This α will be specified below. A subset S ⊆ N is called a coalition and its
cardinality is denoted by |S|. This coalition gives rise to a subgame (S, α) of the original game.
Denote by R(S) the stochastic payoff to coalition S. This payoff is a nonnegative stochastic
variable with finite expectation. An allocation of R(S) among the members in S is a vector of
multiples of R(S), for example p ∈ RS . Then player i ∈ S receives piR(S). Such an allocation is
efficient if p ∈ ∆∗(S) = {p ∈ RS |∑i∈S pi = 1}. Let A be the set of coalitions with payoffs unequal
to the payoff zero for sure.
The preference relation of player i is denoted by %i. We assume the following about this
preference relation.
Assumption 1 ([6]) For each player i ∈ N there exist functions f iS : R → R, for S ∈ A, that
are surjective, continuous and strictly monotone increasing, such that
1. f iS(t)R(S) %i f iT (t′)R(T ) if and only if t ≥ t′,
2. f iS(0) = 0
for any coalitions S and T in A.
This assumption implies that there exists a unique number αi ∈ R such that αiR(T ) ∼i piR(S).
The function αi : A × A × R → R, αi(T, S, pi), is defined to take this unique value. The use of
this function is restricted to i ∈ S ⊆ T . The condition S ⊆ T is not a real restriction because
αi(S, T, pi) is the inverse of αi(T, S, pi). We extend the domain of αi by defining αi(T, S, 0) = 1
and αi(T, T, qi) = 1 if T /∈ A. Two properties are αi(S, S, pi) = 1 and αi(T, S, αi(S,U, pi)) =
αi(T,U, pi) for pi ∈ R and S, T, U ∈ A. If αi(T, S, pi) = piαi(T, S, 1) for all T and S then we
say that αi is linear. Then, αi(S,U, 1)αi(T, S, 1) = αi(T,U, 1). If all αi are identical, that is,
αi(T, S, pi) = αj(T, S, pi) for all i, j ∈ N , then we write α?(T, S, pi) instead of αi(T, S, pi). I(S, α)
is the set of all individual rational allocations for coalition S, that is, all allocations p for which
pi ≥ αi(S, {i}, 1) for all i ∈ S. The set undom(S) contains all the allocations for coalition N that
cannot be dominated by coalition S:
undom(S) = {p ∈ RN | 6 ∃q ∈ ∆∗(S) : αi(N,S, qi) > pi for all i ∈ S}.
The core C(N,α) of the game (N,α) consists of the efficient allocations for coalition N that are
not dominated by any coalition S:
C(N,α) = {p ∈ ∆∗(N)|p ∈ undom(S) for all coalitions S}.
Before we can define marginal vectors, the following assumption is needed.
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Assumption 2 ([6]) If T /∈ A for some coalition T then S /∈ A for all S ⊆ T .
Let σ be a bijection of the players in N then σ(i) denotes the player that is at position i. For
three-person games we may write σ = (σ(1), σ(2), σ(3)). Let Sσi = {σ(k)|k ≤ i} be the set of
the first i players according to σ. The marginal contribution of the ith player according to the
bijection σ in the game (N,α) is
yσσ(i)(α) = 1−
i−1∑
k=1
ασ(k)(Sσi , S
σ
k , y
σ
σ(k)(α))
with the convention yσσ(1)(α) = 1. Now the marginal vector m
σ(α) is defined by
mσσ(i)(α) = ασ(i)(N,S
σ
i , y
σ
σ(i)(α)).
A marginal vector for the subgame (S, α) is denoted by mσ(S, α).
The game (N,α) is superadditive if for all coalitions S, T ⊆ N with S ∩ T = ∅ and for all
allocations p ∈ I(S, α) and q ∈ I(T, α) there exists an allocation r ∈ ∆∗(S ∪ T ) for the joint
coalition such that all players are weakly better off: ri ≥ αi(S ∪ T, S, pi) i ∈ S,ri ≥ αi(S ∪ T, T, qi) i ∈ T. (1)
An equivalent condition is∑
i∈S
αi(S ∪ T, S, pi) +
∑
i∈T
αi(S ∪ T, T, qi) ≤ 1. (2)
A game (N,α) is coalitional-merge convex if for all U ⊆ N , for all S ⊂ T ⊆ N \ U , for all
p ∈ I(S, α), for all q ∈ I(T, α) and for all r ∈ I(S ∪ U,α) such that ri ≥ αi(S ∪ U, S, pi) for all
i ∈ S there exists an allocation s ∈ ∆∗(T ∪ U) such that si ≥ αi(T ∪ U, T, qi) for all i ∈ T,si ≥ αi(T ∪ U, S ∪ U, ri) for all i ∈ U,
or equivalently,∑
i∈T
αi(T ∪ U, T, qi) +
∑
i∈U
αi(T ∪ U, S ∪ U, ri) ≤ 1. (3)
A game is individual-merge convex if for all i ∈ N , for all S ⊂ T ⊆ N \ {i}, for all p ∈ I(S, α),
for all q ∈ I(T, α) and for all r ∈ I(S ∪ {i}, α) such that rj ≥ αj(S ∪ {i}, S, pj) for all j ∈ S there
exists an allocation s ∈ ∆∗(T ∪ {i}) such that sj ≥ αj(T ∪ {i}, T, qj) for all j ∈ T,si ≥ αi(T ∪ {i}, S ∪ {i}, ri) ,
4
or equivalently,∑
j∈T
αj(T ∪ {i}, T, qj) + αi(T ∪ {i}, S ∪ {i}, ri) ≤ 1.
Finally, a game is marginal convex if all marginal vectors belong to the core. It was shown in [6]
that a coalitional-merge convex game is individual-merge convex and an individual-merge convex
game is marginal convex.
Theorem 3 ([6]) If I(S, α) = ∅ for some coalition S then the game (N,α) is not marginal convex.
Some useful properties in a special setting.
Lemma 4 If all αi are linear and identical in the game (N,α) then
1.
∑t
i=1m
σ
σ(i)(α) = α?(N,S
σ
t , 1),
2. undom(S) = {p ∈ RN |∑i∈S pi ≥ α?(N,S, 1)}.
All proofs can be found in appendix A.
3 Marginal convexity and superadditivity
In this section we show that there is in general no relation between marginal convexity and
superadditivity for cooperative games with random payoffs. This is in contrast to the result
for TU games: a TU game is superadditive if all its marginal vectors belong to the core, that
is, it is convex. Further, we present two classes of games for which marginal convexity implies
superadditivity.
The example below shows that superadditive games need not be marginal convex, as is the
case for TU games.
Example 5 Consider the 3-player game (N,α) in which all the αi are linear and identical such
that
S {i} {1, 2} {1, 3} {2, 3}
αi(N,S, 1) 0 1/5 2/5 7/10
Let S, T ⊆ N with S ∩ T = ∅. The superadditivity condition (1) is satisfied if both S and T are
1-player coalitions. Let S = {1} and T = {2, 3}. Take p1 = 1 ∈ I(S, α), (q2, q3) ∈ I(T, α) and
(r1, r2, r3) = (3/10, 7q2/10, 7q3/10). For player 1 we have
r1 ≥ α1(N, {1}, p1)⇔ 3/10 ≥ 0
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and for player i ∈ {2, 3}
ri ≥ αi(N, {2, 3}, qi)⇔ 7qi/10 ≥ 7qi/10
The reader may check that this game is superadditive.
This game is not marginal convex. Take σ = (3, 1, 2). Then yσ3 = 1, y
σ
1 = 1, y
σ
2 = 3/5,
and so mσ(α) = (2/5, 3/5, 0). This marginal vector does not belong to the core since it is domi-
nated by coalition {2, 3}, mσ(α) /∈ undom({2, 3}): let q = (10/11, 1/11) then q ∈ ∆∗({2, 3}) and
αi(N, {2, 3}, qi) = 7qi/10 > mσi (α) for i = 2, 3.
The following example shows a three-person marginal convex game that is not superadditive.
This is in contrast to the result for TU games, namely, convex TU games are superadditive.
Example 6 Consider the game (N,α) with N = {1, 2, 3},
α1(T, S, p1) =

0, |S| = 1,
p1, |S| = |T | > 1,
4p1/5, S = {1, 2}, T = N,
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√
p1/20, S = {1, 3}, T = N, p ≥ 0,
p1/2, S = {1, 3}, T = N, p < 0.
and
αi(T, S, pi) =

0, |S| = 1,
pi, |S| = |T | > 1,
pi/2, S = {1, i}, T = N,
pi/5, S = {2, 3}, T = N,
for i = 2, 3. The six marginal vectors of this game are listed in the table below
σ (1, 2, 3), (1, 3, 2) (2, 1, 3), (2, 3, 1) (3, 1, 2) (3, 2, 1)
mσ(α) (0, 1/2, 1/2) (4/5, 0, 1/5) ( 10
√
1/20, 1− 10√1/20, 0) (4/5, 1/5, 0)
and they all belong to the core
C(N,α) = {p ∈ ∆∗(N)|pi ≥ 0, i ∈ N ; 5p1 + 8p2 ≥ 4; 20(p1)10 + 2p3 ≥ 1; 5p2 + 5p3 ≥ 1}.
Hence, the game is marginal convex. Nevertheless, superadditivity is not satisfied. For this, let
S = {3} and T = {1, 2}. Take p3 = 1 ∈ I({3}, α) and (q1, q2) = (1/8, 7/8) ∈ I({1, 2}, α). Then
α1(N, {1, 2}, q1) + α2(N, {1, 2}, q2) + α3(N, {3}, p3) = 1/ 10
√
160 + 7/16 + 0 > 1,
which contradicts (2). We conclude that the game is not superadditive.
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S α1(N,S, 1)
{1} 15/100
{1, 2} 16/100
{1, 3} 16/100
{1, 4} 17/100
{1, 2, 3} 30/100
{1, 2, 4} 30/100
{1, 3, 4} 30/100
S α2(N,S, 1)
{2} 0/100
{1, 2} 16/100
{2, 3} 16/100
{2, 4} 16/100
{1, 2, 3} 35/100
{1, 2, 4} 40/100
{2, 3, 4} 90/100
S α3(N,S, 1)
{3} 0/100
{1, 3} 16/100
{2, 3} 16/100
{3, 4} 17/100
{1, 2, 3} 35/100
{1, 3, 4} 40/100
{2, 3, 4} 40/100
S α4(N,S, 1)
{4} 0/100
{1, 4} 17/100
{2, 4} 16/100
{3, 4} 17/100
{1, 2, 4} 35/100
{1, 3, 4} 40/100
{2, 3, 4} 40/100
Table 1: This table lists the diverse values of αi(N,S, 1) for the game in example 8.
In the example above player 1 has nonlinear preferences. If a three-person game has linear αi then
marginal convexity implies superadditivity.
Theorem 7 A marginal convex game G is superadditive if it is a three-person game with linear
αi.
This result does not hold for games with at least four players.
Example 8 Consider the game (N,α) with four players, N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, and linear αi. The
various values of αi(N,S, 1) are listed in table 1. Numerous calculations show that all 24 marginal
vectors belong to the core of the game.
Next, let S = {1} and T = {2, 3, 4} and consider the allocations p1 = 1 ∈ I(S, α) and
(q2, q3, q4) = (1, 0, 0) ∈ I(T, α). Then S ∪ T = N and
α1(N,S, p1) +
∑
i∈T
αi(N,T, qi) = 15/100 + 90/100 + 0 + 0 > 1,
which contradicts (2). We conclude that this game is marginal convex but not superadditive.
If we impose the restriction that all αi are linear and identical then marginal convex games
with an arbitrary number of players are superadditive.
Theorem 9 A marginal convex game G is superadditive if all αi are linear and identical.
4 Individual and coalitional merge convexity
In this section we show that an individual-merge convex game need not be coalitional-merge
convex. An example with linear αi is given below. However, as shown further on, if all αi are
linear and identical then individual-merge convexity implies coalitional-merge convexity.
7
S α1(N,S, 1)
{1} 2/100
{1, 2} 26/100
{1, 3} 16/100
{1, 4} 16/100
{1, 2, 3} 40/100
{1, 2, 4} 41/100
{1, 3, 4} 38/100
S α2(N,S, 1)
{2} 2/100
{1, 2} 18/100
{2, 3} 15/100
{2, 4} 12/100
{1, 2, 3} 38/100
{1, 2, 4} 37/100
{2, 3, 4} 34/100
S α3(N,S, 1)
{3} 2/100
{1, 3} 15/100
{2, 3} 15/100
{3, 4} 12/100
{1, 2, 3} 36/100
{1, 3, 4} 58/100
{2, 3, 4} 35/100
S α4(N,S, 1)
{4} 1/100
{1, 4} 15/100
{2, 4} 15/100
{3, 4} 12/100
{1, 2, 4} 35/100
{1, 3, 4} 80/100
{2, 3, 4} 35/100
Table 2: This table lists the diverse values of αi(N,S, 1) for the game in example 10.
Example 10 Consider the game (N,α) with four players, N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, and linear αi. The
various values of αi(N,S, 1) are listed in table 2. Numerous calculations show that this game is
individual-merge convex.
Next, let S = {1}, T = {1, 2} and U = {3, 4}. Consider the allocations p1 = 1 ∈ I(S, α),
(q1, q2) = (8/9, 1/9) ∈ I(T, α) and (r1, r3, r4) = (1/19, 1/29, 1− 1/19− 1/29) ∈ I(S ∪ U,α). Then
r1 ≥ α1(S ∪ U, S, p1), T ∪ U = N and∑
j∈T
αj(N,T, qj) +
∑
i∈U
αi(N,S ∪ U, ri) = 52/225 + 1/50 + 1/50 + (1− 1/19− 1/29)4/5 > 1,
which contradicts (3). We conclude that this game is individual-merge convex but not coalitional-
merge convex.
This example shows that linear αi are not sufficient for individual-merge convex games to imply
coalitional-merge convexity. The next theorem provides a first step to show that linear and
identical αi are sufficient.
Theorem 11 A marginal convex game G is coalitional-merge convex if all αi are linear and
identical.
Since any individual-merge convex game is marginal convex, the result below follows immediately.
Corollary 12 An individual-merge convex game G is coalitional-merge convex if all αi are linear
and identical.
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A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 4.
Let (N,α) be a game with linear and identical αi. The proof of item 1 is by induction. The
statement is correct for t = 1 by definition of marginal vectors. Now assume that the statement
holds for some t ≥ 1. Then
t+1∑
i=1
mσσ(i)(α) =
t∑
i=1
mσσ(i)(α) +m
σ
σ(t+1)(α)
= α?(N,Sσt , 1) + y
σ
σ(t+1)(α)α?(N,S
σ
t+1, 1)
= α?(N,Sσt , 1) + (1−
t∑
k=1
α?(Sσt+1, S
σ
k , y
σ
σ(k)))α?(N,S
σ
t+1, 1)
= α?(N,Sσt , 1) + α?(N,S
σ
t+1, 1)−
t∑
k=1
α?(N,Sσk , y
σ
σ(k))
= α?(N,Sσt , 1) + α?(N,S
σ
t+1, 1)−
t∑
k=1
mσσ(k)(α)
= α?(N,Sσt+1, 1),
where induction is used in the first and last equality.
Finally,
undom(S) = {p ∈ RN | 6 ∃q ∈ ∆∗(S) : qiα?(N,S, 1) > pi for all i ∈ S}
= {p ∈ RN |
∑
i∈S
pi ≥ α?(N,S, 1)},
which shows item 2. 2
Proof of Theorem 7.
Let G = (N,α) be a marginal convex game with linear αi. Let S, T ⊆ N , S ∩ T = ∅. If
|S| = |T | = 1 then the superadditivity condition holds because of theorem 3.
Without loss of generality assume now that |S| = 1 and |T | = 2, that is, S = {i} and T = {j, k}.
Take p ∈ I(S, α), that is, pi = 1. According to theorem 3 there exists q ∈ I(T, α). All elements
in I(T, α) are linear combinations of the two extreme values qa = (αj(T, {j}, 1), 1− αj(T, {j}, 1))
and qb = (1− αk(T, {k}, 1), αk(T, {k}, 1)). Substitution of qa in (2) gives
αi(N, {i}, 1) + αj(N, {j}, 1) + (1− αj(T, {j}, 1))αk(N,T, 1)
= αi(N, {i}, 1) +m(j,k,i)j (α) +m(j,k,i)k (α)
= αi(N, {i}, 1) + 1−m(j,k,i)i (α)
≤ 1.
9
The inequality follows from m(j,k,i) ∈ undom({i}). Similarly, qb satisfies (2). Therefore, this
inequality holds for all q ∈ I(T, α). We conclude that the game is superadditive. 2
Proof of Theorem 9.
Let (N,α) be a marginal convex game with linear and identical αi. Let S, T ⊆ N , S ∩ T = ∅, and
take the allocations p ∈ I(S, α) and q ∈ I(T, α). Then∑
i∈S
αi(S ∪ T, S, pi) +
∑
i∈T
αi(S ∪ T, T, qi) =
∑
i∈S
piα?(S ∪ T, S, 1) +
∑
i∈T
qiα?(S ∪ T, T, 1)
= α?(S ∪ T, S, 1) + α?(S ∪ T, T, 1).
The subgame (S ∪T, α) is also marginal convex [6, theorem 6]. Then mσ(S ∪T, α) ∈ undom(S)∩
undom(T ). Using item 2 in lemma 4, applied to the subgame (S ∪ T, α),
α?(S ∪ T, S, 1) + α?(S ∪ T, T, 1) ≤
∑
i∈S
mσi (S ∪ T, α) +
∑
i∈T
mσi (S ∪ T, α) = 1.
We conclude that the game is superadditive. 2
Proof of Theorem 11.
Let (N,α) be a marginal convex game with linear and identical αi. Let U ⊆ N and S ⊂ T ⊆ N \U .
Further, take p ∈ I(S, α), q ∈ I(T, α) and r ∈ I(S ∪ U,α) such that ri ≥ piα?(S ∪ U, S, 1) for all
i ∈ S. Then∑
i∈U
ri = 1−
∑
i∈S
ri ≤ 1−
∑
i∈S
piα?(S ∪ U, S, 1) = 1− α?(S ∪ U, S, 1)
and consequently∑
i∈U
riα?(T ∪ U, S ∪ U, 1)
≤ (1− α?(S ∪ U, S, 1))α?(T ∪ U, S ∪ U, 1)
= α?(T ∪ U, S ∪ U, 1)− α?(T ∪ U, S, 1). (4)
The subgame (T ∪ U,α) is also marginal convex [6, Theorem 6]. Let σ be such that the players
in S go first, followed by the players in T \ S, then those in U and finally the remaining ones in
N \ (T ∪ U). Then
α?(T ∪ U, S ∪ U, 1) ≤
∑
i∈S∪U
mσi (T ∪ U,α)
=
∑
i∈S
mσi (T ∪ U,α) +
∑
i∈U
mσi (T ∪ U,α)
= α?(T ∪ U, S, 1) +
|T∪U |∑
j=1
mσσ(j)(T ∪ U,α)−
|T |∑
j=1
mσσ(j)(T ∪ U,α)
= α?(T ∪ U, S, 1) + α?(T ∪ U, T ∪ U, 1)− α?(T ∪ U, T, 1)
= α?(T ∪ U, S, 1) + 1− α?(T ∪ U, T, 1),
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where lemma 4, applied to the subgame (T ∪ U,α), is used. Combining this with equation (4)
results in
α?(T ∪ U, T, 1) +
∑
i∈U
riα?(T ∪ U, S ∪ U, 1) ≤ 1,
and so, (3) implies that the game is coalitional-merge convex. 2
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